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Abstract
”Cognitive synergy” refers to a dynamic in which multiple cognitive processes, cooperating to control the
same cognitive system, assist each other in overcoming bottlenecks encountered during their internal processing.
Cognitive synergy has been posited as a key feature of real-world general intelligence, and has been used explicitly
in the design of the OpenCog cognitive architecture. Here category theory and related concepts are used to give
a formalization of the cognitive synergy concept.
A series of formal models of intelligent agents is proposed, with increasing specificity and complexity: simple
reinforcement learning agents; ”cognit” agents with an abstract memory and processing model; hypergraph-based
agents (in which ”cognit” operations are carried out via hypergraphs); hypergraph agents with a rich language
of nodes and hyperlinks (such as the OpenCog framework provides); ”PGMC” agents whose rich hypergraphs
are endowed with cognitive processes guided via Probabilistic Growth and Mining of Combinations; and finally
variations of the PrimeAGI design, which is currently being built on top of OpenCog.
A notion of cognitive synergy is developed for cognitive processes acting within PGMC agents, based on
developing a formal notion of ”stuckness,” and defining synergy as a relationship between cognitive processes in
which they can help each other out when they get stuck. It is proposed that cognitive processes relating to each
other synergetically, associate in a certain way with functors that map into each other via natural transformations.
Cognitive synergy is proposed to correspond to a certain inequality regarding the relative costs of different paths
through certain commutation diagrams.
Applications of this notion of cognitive synergy to particular cognitive phenomena, and specific cognitive
processes in the PrimeAGI design, are discussed.
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1 Introduction
General intelligence is a broad concept, going beyond the ”g-factor” used to measure general intelligence in humans
and broadly beyond the scope of ”humanlike intelligence.” Whichever of the available formalizations of the ”general
intelligence” concept one uses [LH07a, LH07b, Goe10], leads to the conclusion that humanlike minds form only a
small percentage of the space of all possible generally intelligent systems. This gives rise to many deep questions,
including the one that motivates the present paper: Do there exist general principles, which any system must
obey in order to achieve advanced general intelligence using feasible computational resources?
Psychology and neuroscience are nearly mute on this point, since they focus on human and animal intelligence
almost exclusively. The current mathematical theory of general intelligence doesn’t help much either, as it focuses
mainly on the properties of general intelligences that use massive, infeasible amounts of computational resources
[Hut05]. On the other hand, current practical AGI work focuses on specific classes of systems that are hoped to
display powerful general intelligence, and the level of genericity of the underlying design principles is rarely clarified.
For instance, Stan Franklin’s AGI designs [BF09] are based on Bernard Baars’ Global Workspace theory [Baa97],
which is normally presented as a model of human intelligence; it’s unclear whether either Franklin or Baars considers
the Global Workspace theory to possess a validity beyond the scope of humanlike general intelligence.
So, this seemingly basic question about general principles of general intelligence pushes beyond the scope of
current AGI theory and practice, cognitive science and mathematics. This paper seeks to take a small step in the
direction of an answer.
In [GPG13a] one possible general principle of computationally feasible general intelligence was proposed – the
principle of ”cognitive synergy.” The basic concept of cognitive synergy, as presented there, is that general intelli-
gences must contain different knowledge creation mechanisms corresponding to different sorts of memory (declarative,
procedural, sensory/episodic, attentional, intentional); and that these different mechanisms must be interconnected
in such a way as to aid each other in overcoming memory-type-specific combinatorial explosions.
In this paper, cognitive synergy is revisited and given a more formal description in the language of category theory.
This formalization is a presented both for the conceptual clarification it offers, and as a hopeful step toward proving
interesting theorems about the relationship between cognitive synergy and general intelligence, and evaluating the
degree of cognitive synergy enabled by existing or future concrete AGI designs. The relation of the formal notion of
cognitive synergy presented to the OpenCog / PrimeAGI design developed by the author and colleagues [GPG13a]
[GPG13b] is discussed in moderate detail, but this is only one among many possible examples; the general ideas
proposed here should be applicable to a broad variety of AGI designs.
2 Cognit Agents: A General Formalization of Intelligent Systems
We will introduce here a hierarchy of formal models of intelligent agents, beginning with a very simple agent that has
no structure apart from the requirement to issue actions and receive perceptions and rewards; and culminating with a
specific AGI architecture, PrimeAGI 1 [GPG13a][GPG13b]. The steps along the path from the initial simple formal
model toward OpenCog will each add more structure and specificity, restricting scope and making finer-grained
analysis possible. Figure 1 illustrates the hierarchy to be explored.
For the first step in our agent-model hierarchy, which we call a Basic RL Agent (RL for Reinforcement Learning),
we will follow [Hut05, Leg08] and consider a model involving a class of active agents which observe and explore their
environment and also take actions in it, which may affect the environment. Formally, the agent in our model sends
information to the environment by sending symbols from some finite alphabet called the action space Σ; and the
environment sends signals to the agent with symbols from an alphabet called the perception space, denoted P. Agents
can also experience rewards, which lie in the reward space, denoted R, which for each agent is a subset of the rational
unit interval.
The agent and environment are understood to take turns sending signals back and forth, yielding a history of
actions, observations and rewards, which may be denoted
a1o1r1a2o2r2...
1The architecture now labeled PrimeAGI was previously known as CogPrime, and is being implemented atop the OpenCog platform
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Figure 1: An inheritance hierarchy showing the formal models of intelligent agents discussed here, with the most
generic at the top and the most specific at the bottom.
or else a1x1a2x2... if x is introduced as a single symbol to denote both an observation and a reward. The complete
interaction history up to and including cycle t is denoted ax1:t; and the history before cycle t is denoted ax<t =
ax1:t−1.
The agent is represented as a function pi which takes the current history as input, and produces an action as
output. Agents need not be deterministic, an agent may for instance induce a probability distribution over the space
of possible actions, conditioned on the current history. In this case we may characterize the agent by a probability
distribution pi(at|ax<t). Similarly, the environment may be characterized by a probability distribution µ(xk|ax<kak).
Taken together, the distributions pi and µ define a probability measure over the space of interaction sequences.
In [Goe10] this formal agent model is extended in a few ways, intended to make it better reflect the realities of
intelligent computational agents. First, the notion of a goal introduced, meaning a function that maps finite sequences
axs : t into rewards. As well as a distribution over environments, we have need for a conditional distribution γ, so
that γ(g, µ) gives the weight of a goal g in the context of a particular environment µ. . We assume that goals may
be associated with symbols drawn from the alphabet G. We also introduce a goal-seeking agent, which is an agent
that receives an additional kind of input besides the perceptions and rewards considered above: it receives goals.
Another modification is to allow agents to maintain memories (of finite size), and at each time step to carry out
internal actions on their memories as well as external actions in the environment. Of course, this could in principle
be accounted for within Legg and Hutter’s framework by considering agent memories as part of the environment.
However, this would seem an unnecessarily artificial formal model. Instead we introduce a set C of cognitive actions,
and add these into the history of actions, observations and rewards.
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Extending beyond the model given in [Goe10], we introduce here a fixed set of ”cognits” ci (these are atomic
cognitions, in the same way that the pi in the model are atomic perceptions). Memory is understood to contain a mix
of observations, actions, rewards, goals and cognitions. This extension is a significant one because we are going to
model the interaction between atomic cognitions, and in this way model the actual decision-making, action-choosing
actions inside the formal agent. This is big step beyond making a general formal model of an intelligent agent,
toward making a formal model of a particular kind of intelligent agent. It seems to us currently that this sort of
additional specificity is probably necessary in order to say anything useful about general intelligence under limited
computational resources.
The convention we adopt is that: When a cognition is ”activated”, it acts – in principle – on all the other entities
in the memory (though in most cases the result of this action on any particular entity may be null). The result of
the action of cognition ci on the entity x (which is in memory) may be any of:
• causing x to get removed from the memory (”forgotten”)
• causing some new cognitive entity cj to get created in (and then persist in) the memory
• if x is an action, causing x to get actually executed
• if x is a cognit, causing x to get activated
The process of a cognit acting on the memory may take time, during which various perceptions and actions may
occur.
This sort of cognitive model may be conceived in algebraic terms; that is, we may consider ci ∗ x = cj as a
product in a certain algebra. This kind of model has been discussed in detail in [Goe94], where it was labeled a
”self-generating system” and related to various other systems-theoretic models. One subtle question is whether one
allows multiple copies of the same cognitive entity to exist in the memory. I.e. when a new cj is created, what if cj
is already in the memory? Does nothing happen, or is the ”count” of cj in the memory increased? In the latter case,
the memory becomes a multiset, and the product of cognit interactions becomes a (generally quite high dimensional,
usually noncommutative and nonassociative) hypercomplex algebra over the nonnegative integers.
In this extended framework, an interaction/internal-action sequence may be written as
c1a1o1g1r1c2a2o2g2r2...
with the understanding that any of the items in the series may be null. The meaning of ci in the sequence is ”cognit
ci is activated.” One could also extend the model to explicitly incorporate concurrency, i.e.
c11...c1kc1a11...a1ka1o11...o1ko1g11...g1kg1r11...r1kr1c21...c2kc2a21...a2ka2o21...o2ko2g21...g2kg2r21...r2kr2 ...
This Cognit agent is the next step up in our hierarchy of agents as shown in Figure 1. The next step will be
to make the model yet more concrete, by making a more specific assumption about the nature of the cognits being
stored in the memory and activated.
3 Hypergraph Agents
Next we assume that the memory of our cognit-based memory has a more specific structure – that of a labeled
hypergraph. This yield a basic model of a Hypergraph Agent – a specialization of the Cognit Agent model.
Recall that a hypergraph is a graph in which links may optionally connect more than two different nodes.
Regarding labels: We will assume the nodes and links in the hypergraph may optionally be labeled with labels that
are string, or structures of the form (string, vector of ints or floats). Here a string label may be interpreted as a
node/link type indicator, and the numbers in the vector will potentially have different semantics based on the type.
Let us refer to the nodes and links of the memory hypergraph, collectively, as Atoms. In this case the cognits in
the above formal model become either Atoms, or sets of Atoms (subhypergraphs of the overall memory hypergraph).
When a cognit is activated, one or more of the following things happens, depending on the labels on the Atoms in
the cognit:
1. the cognit produces some new cognit, which is determined based on its label and arity – and on the other
cognits that it directly links to, or is directly linked to, within the hypergraph. Optionally, this new cognit
may be activated.
2. the cognit activates one or more of the other cognits that it directly links to, or is directly linked to
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(a) one important example of this is: the cognit, when it is done acting, may optionally re-activate the cognit
that activated it in the first place
3. the cognit is interpreted as a pattern (more on this below), which is then matched against the entire hypergraph;
and the cognits returned from memory as ”matches” are then inserted into memory
4. in some cases, other cognits may be removed from memory (based on their linkage to the cognit being activated)
5. nothing, i.e. not all cognits can be activated
Option 2a allows execution of ”program graphs” embedded in the hypergraph. A cognit c1 may pass activation
to some cognit c2 it is linked to, and then c2 can do some computation and link the results of its computation to c1,
and then pass activation back to c1, which can then do something with the results.
There are many ways to turn the above framework into a Turing-complete hypergraph-based program execution
and memory framework. Indeed one can do this using only Option 1 in the above list. Much of our discussion here
will be quite general and apply to any hypergraph-based agent control framework, including those that use only a
few of the options listed above. However, we will pay most attention to the case where the cognits include some with
fairly rich semantics.
The next agent model in our hierarchy is what we call an Rich Hypergraph Agent, meaning an agent with
a memory hypergraph and a ”rich language” of hypergraph Atom types. In this model, we assume we have Atom
labels for ”variable” and ”lambda” and ”implication” (labeled with a probability value) and ”after” (with a time
duration).; as well as for ”and”, ”or” and ”not”, and a few other programmatic operators.
Given these constructs, we can use a hypergraph some of whose Atoms are labeled ”variable” – such a hypergraph
may be called an ”h-pattern.” We can also combine h-patterns using boolean operations, to get composite h-patterns.
We can replicate probabilistic lambda calculus expressions explicitly in our hypergraph. And, given an h-pattern
and another hypergraph H, we can ask whether P matches H, or whether P matches part of H.
To conveniently represent cognitive processes inside the hypergraph, it is convenient to include the following
labels as primitives: ”create Atom” , ”remove Atom”, plus a few programmatic operations like arithmetic operations
and combinators. In this case the program implementing a cognitive algorithm can be straightforwardly represented
in the system hypergraph itself. (To avoid complexity, we can assume Atom immutability; i.e. make do only with
Atom creation and removal, and carry out Atom modification via removal followed by creation.)
Finally, to get reflection, the state of the hypergraph at each point in time can also be considered as a hypergraph.
Let us assume we have, in the rich language, labels for ”time” and ”atTime.” We can then express, within the
hypergraph itself, propositions of the form ”At time 17:00 on 1/1/2017, this link existed” or ”At time 12:35 on
1/1/2017, this link existed with this particular label.” We can construct subhypergraphs expressing things like ”If
at time T an subhypergraph matching P exists, then s seconds after time T , a subhypergraph matching P1 exists,
with probability p.”
3.0.1 The Rich Hypergraph and OpenCog
The ”rich language” as outlined, is in essence a minimal version of the OpenCog AGI system 2. OpenCog is based on a
large memory hypergraph called the Atomspace, and it contains a number of cognitive processes implemented outside
the Atomspace which act on the Atomspace, alongside cognitive processes implemented inside the Atomspace. It also
contains a wide variety of Atom types beyond the ones listed above as part of the rich language. However, translating
the full OpenCog hypergraph and cognitive-process machinery into the rich language would be straightforward if
laborious.
The main reasons for not implementing OpenCog this way now are computational efficiency and developer
convenience. However, future versions of OpenCog could potentially end up operating via compiling the full OpenCog
hypergraph and cognitive-process model into some variation on the rich language as described here. This would have
advantages where self-programming is concerned.
3.1 Some Useful Hypergraphs
The hypergraph memory we have been discussing is in effect a whole intelligent system – save the actual sensors and
actuators – embodied in a hypergraph. Let us call this hypergraph ”the system” under consideration (the intelligent
system). We also will want to pay some attention to a larger hypergraph we may call the ”meta-system”, which is
2see http://opencog.org for current information, or [GPG13a] [GPG13b] for theoretical background
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created with the same formalism as the system, but contains a lot more stuff. The meta-system records a plenitude
of actual and hypothetical information about the system.
We can represent states of the system within the formalism of the system itself. In essence a ”state” is a
proposition of the form ”h-pattern P1 is present in the system” or ”h-pattern P1 matches the system as a whole.” We
can also represent probabilistic (or crisp) statements about transitions between system states within the formalism
of the system, using lambdas and probabilistic implications. To be useful, the meta-system will need to contain a
significant amount of Atoms referring to states of the system, and probabilistically labeled transitions between these
states.
The implications representing transitions between two states, may be additionally linked to Atoms indicating
the proximal cause of the transition. For the purpose of modeling cognitive synergy in a simple way, we are most
concerned with the case in which there is a relatively small integer number of cognitive processes, whose action
reasonably often cause changes in the system’s state. (We may also assume some can occur for other reasons besides
the activity of cognitive processes, e.g. inputs coming into the system, or simply random changes.)
So for instance if we have two cognitive processes called Reasoning and Blending, which act on the system,
then these processes each correspond to a subgraph of the meta-system hypergraph: the subgraph containing the
links indicating the state transitions effected by the process in question, and the nodes joined by these links. This
representation makes sense whether or not the cognitive processes are implemented within the hypergraph, or a
external processes acting on the system. We may call these ”CPT graphs”, short for ”Cognitive Process Transition
hypergraphs.”
4 PGMC Agents: Intelligent Agents with Cognition Driven by Proba-
bilistic History Mining
For understanding cognitive synergy thoroughly, it is useful to dig one level deeper and model the internals of
cognitive processes in a way that is finer-grained and yet still abstract and broadly applicable.
4.1 Cognitive Processes and Homomorphism
In principle cognitive processes may be very diverse in their implementation as well as their conceptual logic. The
rich language as outlined above enables implementation of anything that is computable. In practice, however, it
seems that the cognitive processes of interest for human-like cognition may be summarized as sets of hypergraph
rewrite rules, of the sort formalized in [BM02]. Roughly, a rule of that sort has an input h-pattern and an output
h-pattern, along with optional auxiliary functions that determine the numerical weights associated with the Atoms
in the output h-pattern, based on combination of the numerical weights in the input h-pattern.
Rules of this nature may be, but are not required to be, homomorphisms. One conjecture we make, however, is that
for the cognitive processes of interest for human-like cognition, most of the rules involved (if one ignores the numerical-
weights auxiliary functions) are in fact either hypergraph homomorphisms, or inverses of hypergraph homomorphisms.
Recall that a graph (or hypergraph) homomorphism is a composition of elementary homomorphisms, each one of
which merges two nodes into a new node, in a way that the new node inherits the connections of its parents. So the
conjecture is
Conjecture 1. Most operations undertaken by cognitive processes take the form either of:
• Merging two nodes into a new node, which inherits its parents’ links
• Splitting a node into two nodes, so that the children’s links taken together compose the (sole) parent’s links
(and then doing some weight-updating on the product).
4.2 Operations on Cognitive Process Transition Hypergraphs
One can place a natural Heyting algebra structure on the space of hypergraphs, using the disjoint union for unionsq, the
categorial (direct) product for u, and a special partial order called the cost-order, described in [Goe17]. This Heyting
algebra structure then allows one to assign probabilities to hypergraphs within a larger set of hypergraphs, e.g. to
sub-hypergraphs within a larger hypergraph like the system or meta-system under consideration here. As reviewed in
[Goe17], this is an intuitionistic probability distribution lacking a double negation property, but this is not especially
problematic.
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It is worth concretely exemplifying what these Heyting algebra operators mean in the context of CPT graphs.
Suppose we have two CPT graphs A and B, representing the state transitions corresponding to two different cognitive
processes.
The meet A u B is a graph representing transitions between conjuncted states of the system (e.g. ”System has
h-pattern P445 and h-pattern P7555”, etc.). If A contains a transition between P445 and P33, and B contains a
transition between P7555 and P1234; then, AuB will contain a transition between P445&P7555 and P33&P1234. Clearly,
if A and B are independent processes, then the probability of the meet of the two graphs will be the product of the
probabilities of the graphs individually
The join AunionsqB is a graph representing, side by side, the two state transition graphs – as if we had a new process
AorB, and a state of this new process could be either a state of A, or a state of B. If A and B are disjoint processes
(with no overlapping states), then the probability of the join of the two graphs, is the sum of the probabilities of the
graphs individually
The exponent AB is a graph whose nodes are functions mapping states of B into states of A. So e.g. if B is
a perception process and A is an action process, each node in AB represents a function mapping perception-states
into action-states. Two such functions F and G are linked only if, whenever node b1 and node b2 are linked in B,
F (b1) and G(b2) are linked in G. I.e. F and G are linked only if (F,G)(link(x, y)) = link(F (x), G(y)), where by
(F,G)(link(x, y)) one means the set F (x), G(y).
So e.g. two perception-to-action mappings F and G are adjacent in actionperception iff, whenever two perceptions
p1 and p2 are adjacent, the action a1 = F (p1) is adjacent to the action a2 = G(p2). For instance, if
• F (perception p) = the action of carrying out perception p
• G(perception p) = the action done in reaction to seeing perception p
and
• p1 = hearing the cat
• p2 = looking at the cat
We then need
• F (p1) = the act of hearing the cat (cocking one?s ear etc.)
• G(p2) = the response to looking at the cat (raising ones eyes and making a startled expression)
to be adjacent in the graph of actions. If this is generally true for various (p1, p2) then F and G are adjacent
in actionperception. Note that actionperception is also the implication perception → action, where → is the Heyting
algebra implication.
Finally, according to the definition of cost-based order A < A1 if A and A1 are homomorphic, and the shortest
path to creating A1 from irreducible source graph, is to first create A. In the context of CPT graphs, for instance,
this will hold if A1 is a broader category of cognitive actions than A. If A denotes all facial expression actions, and
A1 denotes all physical actions, then we will have A < A1.
4.3 PGMC: Cognitive Control with Pattern and Probability
Different cognitive processes may unfold according to quite different dynamics. However, from a general intelligence
standpoint, we believe there is a common control logic that spans multiple cognitive processes – namely, adaptive
control based on historically observed patterns. This process has been formalized and analyzed in a previous paper
by the author [Goe16b], where it was called PGMC or ”Probabilistic Growth and Mining of Combinations”; in this
section we port that analysis to the context of the current formal model. This leads us to the next step in our hierarchy
of agents models, a PGMC Agent, meaning an agent with a rich hypergraph memory, and homomorphism/history-
mining based cognitive processes.
Consider the subgraph of a particular CPT graph that lies within the system at a specific point in time. The
job of the cognitive control process (CCP) corresponding to a particular cognitive process, is to figure out what (if
anything) that cognitive process should do next, to extend the current CPT graph. A cognitive process may have
various specialized heuristics for carrying out this estimation, but the general approach we wish to consider here is
one based on pattern mining from the system’s history.
In accordance with our high-level formal agents model, we assume that the system has certain goals, which
manifest themselves as a vector of fuzzy distributions over the states of the system. Representationally, we may
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assume a label ”goal”, and then assume that at any given time the system has n specific goals; and that, for each
goal, each state may be associated with a number that indicates the degree to which it fulfills that goal.
It is quite possible that the system’s dynamics may lead it to revise its own goals, to create new goals for itself,
etc. However, that is not the process we wish to focus on here. For the moment we will assume there is a certain set
of goals associated with the system; the point, then, is that a CCP’s job is to figure out how to use the corresponding
cognitive process to transition the system to states that will possess greater degrees of goal achievement.
Toward that end, the CCP may look at h-patterns in the subset of system history that is stored within the system
itself. From these h-patterns, probabilistic calculations can be done to estimate the odds that a given action on the
cognitive process’s part, will yield a state manifesting a given amount of progress on goal achievement. In the case
that a cognitive process chooses its actions stochastically, one can use the h-patterns inferred from the remembered
parts of the system’s history to inform a probability distribution over potential actions. Choosing cognitive actions
based on the distribution implied by these h-patterns can be viewed a novel form of probabilistic programming, driven
by fitness-based sampling rather than Monte Carlo sampling or optimization queries – this is the the ”Probabilistic
Growth and Mining of Combinations” (PGMC), process described and analyzed in [Goe16b].
Based on inference from h-patterns mined from history, a CCP can then create probabilistically weighted links
from Atoms representing h-patterns in the system’s current state, to Atoms representing h-patterns in potential
future states. A CCP can also, optionally, create probabilistically weighted links from Atoms representing potential
future state h-patterns (or present state h-patterns) to goals. It will often be valuable for these various links to
be weighted with confidence values alongside probability values; or (almost) equivalently with interval (imprecise)
probability values [GIGH08].
5 Theory of Stuckness
In a real-world cognitive system, each CCP will have a certain limited amount of resources, which it can either use
for its own activity, or transfer to another cognitive process. In OpenCog, for instance, space and time resources tend
to be managed somewhat separately, which would mean that a pair of floats would be a reasonable representation
of an amount of resources. For our current theoretical purposes, however, the details of the resource representation
don’t matter much.
Let us say that a CCP, at a certain point in time, is ”stuck” if it does not see any high-confidence, high-probability
transitions associated with its own corresponding cognitive process, from current state h-patterns to future state h-
patterns that have significantly higher goal-achievement values. If a CCP is stuck, then it may not be worthwhile
for the CCP to spend its limited resources taking any action at that point. Or, in some cases, it may be the best
move for that CCP to transfer some of its allocated resources so some other cognitive process. This leads us straight
on to cognitive synergy. But before we go there, let us pause to get more precise about how ”getting stuck” should
be interpreted in this context.
5.0.1 A Formal Definition of Stuckness
Let GA denote the CPT graph corresponding to cognitive process A. This is a subgraph of the overall cognitive
process transition graph of the system, and it may be considered as a category unto itself, with object being the
subgraphs, and a Heyting algebra structure.
Given a particular situation S (”possible world”) involving the system’s cognition, and a time interval I, let e.g.
GS,IA denote the CPT graph of A during time interval I, insofar as it exists explicitly in the system (not just in the
metasystem).
Where P is a h-pattern in the system, and (S, I) is a situation/time-interval pair, let P (S, I) denote the degree to
which the system displays h-pattern P in situation S during time-interval I. Let g(S, I) denote the average degree
of goal-achievement of the system in situation S at time during time interval I. Then if we identify a set I of
time-intervals of interest, we can calculate
g(P ) =
∑
(S,I),I∈I g(S, I)P (S, I)∑
(S,I),I∈I P (S, I)
to be the degree to which P implies goal-achievement, in general (relative to I; but if this set of intervals is chosen
reasonably, this dependency should not be sensitive).
On the other hand, it is more interesting to look at the degree to which P implies goal-achievement across the
possible futures of the system as relevant in a particular situation at a particular point in time. Suppose the system
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is currently in situation S, during time interval IS . Then I may be defined, for instance, as a set of time intervals
in the near future after IS . One can then look at
gS,IS ,I(P ) =
∑
(S′,I),I∈I g(S
′, I)P (S′, I)Prob((S′, I)|(S, t))∑
(S′,I),I∈I P (S′, I)Prob((S′, I)|(S, t))
which measures the degree to which P implies goal-achievement in situations that may occur in the near future after
being in situation S. The confidence of this value may be assessed as
cS,IS ,I(P ) = f(
∑
(S′,I),I∈I
P (S′, I)Prob((S′, I)|(S, t)))
where f is a monotone increasing function with range [0, 1]. This confidence value is a measure of the amount of
evidence on which the estimate gS′,IS (P ) is based, scaled into [0, 1].
Finally, we may define eC,IR,S,IS (P, I, IP ) as the probability estimate that the CCP corresponding to cognitive
process C holds for the proposition that: In situation S during time interval IS , if allocated a resource amount in
interval IR for making the choice, C will make a choice leading to a situation in which P (S, I) ∈ IP during interval
I (assuming I is after IS). A confidence value cC,IR,S,IS (P, I, IP ) may be defined similarly to cS′,t(P ) above.
Given a set I of time intervals, one can define eC,IR,S,I(P, I, IP ) and cC,IR,S,I(P, I, IP ) via averaging over the
intervals in I.
The confidence with which C knows how to move forward toward the system’s goals in situation S at time t may
then be summarized as
confC,S,IS ,I = maxP (gS′,IS ,I(P )cS′,IS ,I(P )eC,IR,S,I(P, I, IP )cC,IR,S,I(P, I, IP ))
with
stuckC,S,IS ,I = 1− confC,S,IS ,I
6 Cognitive Synergy: A Formal Exploration
What we need for ”cognitive synergy” between A and B to exist, is for it to be the case that: For many situations
S and times t, exactly one of A and B is stuck.
In the metasystem, records of cases where one or both of A or B were stuck, will be recorded as hypergraph
patterns. The set of (S, t) pairs in the metasystem where exactly one of A and B was stuck to a degree of stuck-ness
in interval Id = (L,U), has a certain probability in the set of all (S, t) pairs in the metasystem. Let us call this set
stuckA,B,Id .
The set GstuckA,B,Id of CPT graphs G
S,t
A , G
S,t
B corresponding to the (S, t) pairs in stuckA,B,Id can also be isolated in
the metasystem, and has a certain probability considered as a subgraph of the metasystem (which can be calculated
according to the intuitionistic graph probability distribution). An overall index of cognitive synergy between A and
B can then be calculated as follows.
Let P be a partition of [0, 1] (most naturally taken equispaced). Then,
cog-synA,B,P =
∑
Id∈P wIdProb(G
stuck
A,B,Id
)∑
I∈P wId
is a quantitative measure of the amount of cognitive synergy between A and B.
Extension of the above definition to more than two cognitive processes is straightforward. Given N cognitive
processes, we can look at pairwise synergies between them, and also at triple-wise synergies, etc. To define triplewise
synergies, we can look at stuckA,B,C,Id , defined as the set of (S, I) where all but one of the three cognitive processes
A, B and C is stuck to a degree in Id. Triplewise synergies correspond to cases where the system would be stuck if
it had only two of the three cognitive processes, much more often than it’s stuck given that it has all three of them.
6.1 Cognitive Synergy and Homomorphisms
The existence of cognitive synergy between two cognitive processes will depend sensitively on how these cognitive
processes actually work. However, there are likely some general principles at play here. For instance we suggest
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Conjecture 2. In a PGMC agent operating within feasible resource constraints: If two cognitive processes A and
B have a high degree of cognitive synergy between them, then there will tend to be a lot of low-cost homomorphisms
between subgraphs of GS,tA and G
S,t
B , but not nearly so many low-cost isomorphisms.
The intuition here is that, if the two CPT graphs are too close to isomorphic, then they are unlikely to offer many
advantages compared to each other. They will probably succeed and fail in the same situations. On the other hand,
if the two CPT graphs don’t have some resemblance to each other, then often when one cognitive process (say, A)
gets stuck, the other one (say, B) won’t be able to use the information produced by A during its work so far, and
thus won’t be able to proceed efficiently. Productive synergy happens when one has two processes, each of which
can transform the other one’s intermediate results, at somewhat low cost, into its own internal language – but where
the internal languages of the two processes are not identical.
Our intuition is that a variety of interesting rigorous theorems likely exist in the vicinity of this informal conjecture.
However, much more investigation is required.
Along these lines, recall Conjecture 1 above that most cognitive processes useful for human-like cognition, are
implemented in terms of rules that are mostly homomorphisms or inverse homomorphisms. To the extent this is the
case, it fits together very naturally with Conjecture 2.
Suppose GS,tA and G
S,t
B each consist largely of records of enacting a series of hypergraph homomorphisms (followed
by weight updates), as Conjecture 2 posits. Then one way Conjecture ?? would happen would be if the homomor-
phisms in GS,tA mapped homomorphically into the homomorphisms in G
S,t
B . That is, if we viewed G
S,t
A and G
S,t
B as
their own categories, the homomorphisms posited in Conjecture 3 would take the form of functors between these two
categories.
6.2 Cognitive Synergy and Natural Transformations
Further interesting twists emerge if one views the cognitive process A as associated with a functor FA that maps G
S
into GSA ⊆ GS , which has the property that it maps GS,t into GS,tA ⊆ GS,t as well. The functor FA maps a state
transition subgraph of S, into a state transition subgraph involving only transitions effected by cognitive process A.
So for instance, if X represents a sequence of cognitive operations and conclusions that have transformed the state of
the system, then FA(X) represents the closest match to X in which all the cognitive operations involved are done by
cognitive process A. The cost of FA(X) may be much higher than the cost of X, e.g. if X involves vision processing
and A is logical inference, then in F (X) all the transitions involved in vision processing need to be effected by logical
operations, which is going to be much more expensive than doing them in other ways.
A natural transformation ηA,B from FA to FB associates to every object X in G
S (i.e., to every subgraph of
the transition graph GS of the system S) a morphism ηA,BX : FA(X) → FB(X) in GS so that: for every morphism
f : X → Y in GS (i.e. every homomorphic transformation from state transition subgraph X to state transition
subgraph Y ) we have ηA,BY ◦ FA(f) = FB(f) ◦ ηA,BX .
This leads us on to our final theoretical conjecture:
Conjecture 3. In a PGMC agent operating within feasible resource constraints, suppose one has two cognitive
processes A and B, which display significant cognitive synergy, as defined above. Then,
1. there is likely to be a natural transformation ηA,B between the functor FA and the functor FB – and also a
natural transformation ηB,A going in the opposite direction
2. the two different routes from the upper left to the bottom right of the commutation diagram corresponding to
ηA,B,
FA(X)
FA(f) //
ηA,BX

FA(Y )
ηA,BY

FB(X)
FB(f)
// FB(Y )
(1)
will often have quite different total costs
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3. Referring to the above commutation diagram and the corresponding diagram for ηB,A,
FB(X)
FB(f) //
ηB,AX

FB(Y )
ηB,AY

FA(X)
FA(f)
// FA(Y )
(2)
– often it will involve significantly less total cost to
• travel from FA(X) to FB(Y ) via the left-bottom path in Equation 2, and then from FB(Y ) to FA(Y ) via
the right side of Equation 2; than to
• travel from FA(X) to FA(Y ) directly via the top of Equation 2
That is, often it will be the case that
cost(FA(X)
ηA,BX−−−→ FB(X))
+
cost(FB(X)
FB(f)−−−−→ FB(Y ))
+
cost(FB(Y )
ηB,AY−−−→ FA(Y )

cost(FA(X)
FA(f)−−−−→ FA(Y ))
(3)
Inequality 3 basically says that, given the cost weightings of the arrows, it may sometimes be significantly more
efficient to get from FA(X) to FA(Y ) via an indirect route involving cognitive process B, than to go directly from
FA(X) to FA(Y ) using only cognitive process A. This is a fairly direct expression of the cognitive synergy between
A and B in terms of commutation diagrams.
To make this a little more concrete, suppose X is a transition graph including the new conclusion that Bob is
nice, and Y is a transition graph including additionally the even newer conclusion that Bob is helpful. Then f
represents a homomorphism mapping X into Y , via – in one way or another – adding to the system’s memory the
conclusion that Bob is helpful. Suppose A is a cognitive process called ”inference” and B is one called ”evolutionary
learning.” Then e.g. FA(X) refers to a version of X in which all conclusions are drawn by inference, and FB(Y )
refers to a version of Y in which all conclusions are drawn by evolutionary learning. The commutation diagram for
ηA,B = ηinference,evolution, then looks like
Finference(BobNice)
Finference(fnice→helpful) //
ηinference,evolutionBobNice

Finference(BobHelpful)
ηinference,evolutionBobHelpful

Fevolution(BobNice)
Fevolution(fnice→helpful)
// Fevolution(BobHelpful)
(4)
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and the commutation diagram for ηevolution,inference looks like
Fevolution(BobNice)
Fevolution(fnice→helpful) //
ηevolution,inferenceBobNice

Fevolution(BobHelpful)
ηevolution,inferenceBobHelpful

Finference(BobNice)
Finference(fnice→helpful)
// Finference(BobHelpful)
(5)
The conjecture states that, for cognitive synergy to occur, the cost of getting from Finference(BobNice) to
Finference(BobHelpful) directly via the top arrow of Equation 4 would be larger than the cost of getting there via
the left and then bottom of Equation 4 followed by the right of Equation 5. That is to get from ”Bob is nice” to
”Bob is helpful”, where both are represented in inferential terms, it may still be lower-cost to map ”Bob is nice”
into evolutionary-programming terms, then use evolutionary programming to get to the evolutionary-programming
version of ”Bob is helpful”, and then map the answer back into inferential terms.
7 Some Core Synergies of Cognitive Systems: Consciousness, Selves
and Others
The paradigm case of cognitive synergy is where the cognitive processes A and B involved are learning, reasoning or
pattern recognition algorithms. However, it is also interesting and important to consider cases where the cognitive
processes involved correspond to different scales of processing, or different types of subsystem of the same cognitive
system. For instance, one can think about:
• A = long-term memory (LTM), B = working memory (WM)
• A = whole-system structures and dynamics, B = the system’s self-model
• A and B are different ”sub-selves” of the same cognitive system
• A is the system’s self-model, and B is the system’s model of another cognitive system (another person, another
robot, etc.)
Conjecturally and intuitively, it is natural to hypothesize that
• Homomorphisms between LTM and WM are what ensure that ideas can be moved back and forth from one
sort of memory to another, with a loss of detail but not a total loss of essential structure.
• Homomorphisms between the whole system’s structures and dynamics (as represented in its overall state
transition graph) and the structures and dynamics in its self-model, are what make the self-model structurally
reflective of the whole system, enabling cognitive dynamics on the self-model to be mapped meaningfully (i.e.
morphically) into cognitive dynamics in the whole system, and vice versa
• Homomorphisms between the whole system in the view of one subself, and the whole system in the view of an
other subself, are what enable two different subselves to operate somewhat harmoniously together, controlling
the same overall system and utilizing the knowledge gained by one another
• Homomorphisms between the system’s self-model and its model of another cognitive system, enable both
theory-of-mind type modeling of others, and learning about oneself by analogy to others (critical for early
childhood learning)
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Cognitive synergy in the form of natural transformations between LTM and WM means that when unconscious
LTM cognitive processing gets stuck, it can push relevant knowledge to WM and sometimes the solution will pop up
there. Correspondingly, when WM gets stuck, it can throw the problem to the unconscious LTM processing, and hope
the answer is found there, later to bubble up into WM again (the throwing down being according to a homomorphic
mapping, and the bubbling up being according to another homomorphic mapping). As WM is closely allied with
what is colloquially referred to as ”consciousness” [Goe14] – meaning the reflective, deliberative consciousness that
we experience when we reason or reflect on something in our ”mind’s eye” – this particular synergy appears key to
human conscious experience. As we move thoughts, ideas and feelings back and forth between our focus of attention
and the remainder of our mind and memory, we are experiencing this synergy intensively on an everyday basis – or
so the present hypothesis suggests; i.e. that
• When we pull a memory into attention, or push something out of attention into the ”unconscious”, we are
enacting homomorphisms on our mind’s state transition graph
• When the unconscious solves a problem that the focus of attention pushed into it, and then the answer comes
back into the attentional focus and gets deliberatively reasoned on more, this is the action of the natural
transformation between unconscious and conscious cognitive processes – it’s a case where the cost of going the
long way around the commutation diagram from conscious to unconscious and back, was lower than the cost
of going directly from conscious premise to conscious conclusion.
Cognitive synergy in the form of natural transformations between system and self mean that when the system
as a whole cannot figure out how to do something, it will map this thing into the self-model (via a many-to-one
homomorphism, generally, as the capacity of the self-model is much smaller), and see if cognitive processes acting
therein can solve the problem. Similarly, if thinking in terms of the self-model doesn’t resolve a solution to the
problem, then sometimes ”just doing it” is the right approach – which means mapping the problem the self-model’s
associated cognitive processes are trying to solve back to the whole system, and letting the whole system try its
mapped version of the problem by any means it can find.
Cognitive synergy in the form of natural transformations between subselves means that when one subself gets
stuck, it may map the problem into the cognitive vernacular of another subself and see what the latter can do. For
instance if one subself, which is very aggressive and pushy, gets stuck in a personal relationship issue, it may map
this issue into the world-view of another more agreeable and empathic and submissive subself, and see if the latter
can find a solution to the problem. Many people navigate complex social situations via this sort of ongoing switching
back and forth between subselves that are well adapted to different sorts of situations [Row90].
Cognitive synergy in the form of natural transformations between self-model and other-model means that when
one get stuck in a self-decision, one can implicitly ask ”what would I do if I were this other mind?” ... ”what would
this other mind do in this situation?” It also means that, when one can’t figure out what another mind is going to
do via other routes, one can map the other mind’s situation back into one’s self-model, and ask ”what would I do in
their situation?” ... ”what would it be like to be that other mind in this situation?”
In all these cases, we can see the possibility of much the same sort of process as we conjecture to exist between two
cognitive processes like evolutionary learning and logical inference. We have different structures (memory subsystems,
models of various internal or external systems, systematic complexes of knowledge and behavior, etc.) associated
with different habitual sets of cognitive processes. Each of these habitual sets of processes may get stuck sometimes,
and may need to call out to others for help in getting unstuck. This sort of request for help is going to be most feasible
if the problem can be mapped into the cognitive world of the helper in a way that preserves its essential structure,
even if not all its details; and if the answer the helper finds is then mapped back in a similarly structure-preserving
way.
Real-world cognitive systems appear to consist of multiple subsystems that are each more effective at solving
certain classes of problems – subsystems like particular learning and reasoning processes, models of self and other,
memory systems of differing capacity, etc. A key aspect of effective cognition is the ability for these various subsystems
to ask each other for help in very granular ways, so that the helper can understand something of the intermediate
state of partial-solution that the requestor has found itself in. This sort of ”cognitive synergy” seems to be reflected,
in an abstract sense, in certain ”algebraic” or category-theoretic symmetries such as we have highlighted here.
To achieve this abstract modeling of cognitive-process interdependencies in terms of formal symmetries, we have
modeled cognitive systems as hypergraphs and made various additional assumptions; however, we suspect that many
of these assumptions are not actually necessary for the main conjectures we have proposed to be true in some form.
Our aim has been, not to propose the most general possible model for exploring these ideas, but rather to outline
a relatively simple and general model that enables some of the core underlying symmetries to be articulated in a
reasonably elegant way.
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8 Cognitive Synergy in the PrimeAGI Design
The PrimeAGI cognitive architecture [GPG13a][GPG13b], implemented within the OpenCog software platform,
works within the ”PGMC-driven rich hypergraph memory model” agent framework outlined above, extending it via
introducing a specific set of cognitive processes. These cognitive processes act on the hypergraph, mapping the nodes
and links they find into new nodes and links, or changing the weights of existing nodes and links.
The particulars of PrimeAGI have been reviewed elsewhere and we will not attempt to give a good summary
here, but we will note some of the key cognitive processes.
Let us begin with the key learning and reasoning algorithms:
• PLN: a forward and backward chaining based probabilistic logic engine, based on the Probabilistic Logic
Networks formalism
• MOSES: an evolutionary program learning framework, incorporating rule-based program normalization, prob-
abilistic modeling and other advanced features
• ECAN: nonlinear-dynamics-based ”economic attention allocation”, based on spreading of ShortTermImpor-
tance and LongTermImportance values and Hebbian learning
• Pattern Mining: information-theory based greedy hypergraph pattern mining
• Clustering and Concept Blending: heuristics for forming new ConceptNodes from existing ones
The implementation of PrimeAGI in OpenCog is complex, and each of these cognitive processes is implemented
in its own way, for a mix of fundamental and historical reasons. At present some aspects of these cognitive processes
are represented within the hypergraph as nodes and links, and other aspects are represented as external software
processes; however, there is a design intention to gradually represent all the core cognitive processes of the system
within the hypergraph itself.
In [Goe16a] the core logic of each of these cognitive processes has been expressed in terms of the PGMC (Proba-
bilistic Growth and Mining of Combinations) framework outlined above. The control of these cognitive processes does
not, at the present time, follow the PGMC logic in any systematic way; however, the PGMC-ization of OpenCog’s
cognitive processes is planned for 2017-18, and is currently underway.
Detailed explication of cognitive synergy in PrimeAGI in terms of the formalization of cognitive synergy outlined
here would be a significant undertaking and we will pursue this in a future paper. However, the basic concepts are
not difficult to outline.
Underlying the manifestation of cognitive synergy in PrimeAGI (and indeed any rich hypergraph based AI system
involving logic as well as program execution) is the Curry-Howard correspondence. In the PrimeAGI context, this
gives an isomorphic mapping from the program-execution transition graph created via executing hypergraph nodes
containing executable operations (ExecutionOutputLink in OpenCog syntax), and the transition graph created by
logical inferences in PLN logic. That is, it explains how sub-hypergraphs corresponding to sets of coordinated
executable operations can be mapped into sub-hypergraphs corresponding to logical derivations, and vice versa.
Now let us see some of the places where the potential for cognitive synergy exists:
• Pattern mining works by growing h-pattern hypergraphs into larger ones.
• PLN inference can also be used this way, in that one can feed it an h-pattern as a premise; but it then
searches the space of possible extensions of its premise, using forward and/or backward chaining, and estimates
probabilities associated with these extensions, in a different way than the Pattern Miner.
• MOSES expands h-patterns in yet a different way, in the sense that each of its ”demes” (evolutionary subpop-
ulations) begins with a program tree (which can be expressed as an h-pattern) as its seed, and then expands
this program tree, step by step.
So: If any of these three processes gets stuck in expanding a certain h-pattern usefully, it may meaningfully ask one
or both of the others to help out and try its own heuristics for expansion. Pattern mining has the power of brute
force, MOSES has the creativity of evolution, and PLN has the ingenuity of probabilistic logic; in any given case, one
or the other method may prove more capable than the other of finding the interesting extensions of the h-pattern in
question.
Clustering and concept blending serve to create new concepts, which are then rated as to their quality. Either may
get stuck, in the sense that, when directed to form new concepts in some particular context, they may persistently
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fail to form new concepts with decent quality rating. In this case they may help each other out. Clustering may
form new concepts that are then used as properties in the blending process. Blending may produce new concepts to
be clustered. Conceptually, it seems clear that there is significant synergy between clustering and blending; though
this has yet to be studied empirically in a systematic way.
Pattern mining, PLN and MOSES act largely on nodes that are already there in the hypergraph; however, if
they get stuck in a certain context, it may be to their benefit to invoke clustering and/or concept blending to form
new concepts, new nodes that will then appear in the h-patterns that they use in their cognitive processing. On the
other hand, if clustering or blending is performing poorly in a certain context, they may do better to ask PLN or
MOSES to form some new links connecting to the nodes they are acting on. These new links will then be considered
by clustering and blending operations, potentially leading them to better results.
Additionally, in PrimeAGI, the choices of all the cognitive processes are guided by ECAN, in the sense that they
choose Atoms to act on, with attention to the ShortTermImportance values of the Atoms, which are adjusted by
ECAN’s spreading activation and associated processes. These other cognitive processes also stimulate Atoms that
they utilize and find important, increasing the ShortTermImportance of these Atoms incrementally. The combination
of ECAN-based factors and cognitive-process-internal factors in the choice of which Atoms to consider, intrinsically
constitutes a form of cognitive synergy. To wit:
• When the internal factors within a cognitive process would not have enough information to guide the cognitive
process and would lead it to get ”stuck”, then ECAN (e.g. doing activation spreading and HebbianLink
formation based on the recent activity of the cognitive process in question) may provide guidance and help it
out.
• On the other hand, if a certain set S of Atoms is important, ECAN itself can do only a limited job of figuring
out what other Atoms are also going to be important as a consequence. Having other cognitive processes act
on S will produce new information that will allow ECAN to do its job better, via spreading along the new links
that these other cognitive processes create from the Atoms in S to other Atoms.
Beyond these synergies between learning and reasoning algorithms, one can see potential in PrimeAGI for synergies
between various internal structures and models, as discussed in section 7 above.
The working memory in OpenCog is associated with a structure called the AttentionalFocus (AF), comprising
those Atoms with the highest ShortTermImportance values as determined by ECAN. Many cognitive processes
operate on Atoms in the AF differently than on the rest of the system’s memory hypergraph. Synergy between
AF-based processing and generic memory-based processing is indeed critical for intelligent system functionality.
PrimeAGI explicitly supports two styles of memory representation: local representation (e.g. a ConceptNode
labeled ”cat”), and more ”global” distributed representation (e.g. a network of nodes and links, whose collective
pattern of activity represents the system’s understanding of what is a ”cat”). Most of the work with OpenCog
so far has focused on the local representation, but according to the theory underlying the system, both styles of
representation will be necessary in order to achieve a high level of general intelligence. If one looks at manipulation
of local representations and manipulation of distributed representations as different cognitive processes, then one
can apply the model of cognitive synergy presented here to analyze the situation. In OpenCog lingo, the process of
turning a distributed representation into a localized one is called ”map encapsulation”; and the process of turning
a localized representation into a distributed one occurs implicitly as a result of integrated PLN and ECAN activity
(alongside other cognitive processes). This suggests that, in the language of Conjecture 3 one could model
• ηdistributed representation,local representation = map encapsulation
• ηlocal representation,distributed representation = PLN, ECAN, etc.
Synergy is also likely to exist between different connectivity patterns in OpenCog’s Atomspace, in the context of
application to any complex domain. Part of the theoretical basis for PrimeAGI is the notion of the ”dual network”
– hierarchical and heterarchical knowledge networks that are aligned to work effectively together. Patterns in the
system’s hypergraphs memory are often naturally arranged in a hierarchy, from more specialized to more general;
but also, within each hierarchical level, patterns are also often associated with other patterns with which they share
various properties. The heterarchy helps with the building of the hierarchy, and vice versa. If we let A denote the
cognitive processes of maintaining the hierarchy, and B denote the cognitive processes of maintaining the heterarchy,
then the core idea of the ”dual network” in PrimeAGI is not just that coupled hierarchical and heterarchical structures
exist, but also that the processes A and B of maintaining them interact in a cognitively-synergetic way.
The above arguments regarding cognitive synergy in PrimeAGI have obviously been somewhat ”hand-wavy”. To
cash them out as precise arguments would require significant explication, as each of these cognitive processes is a
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complex mathematical entity unto itself – and the behavior of each of these processes depends, sometimes subtly,
on the real-world situations in which it is exercised. The abstractions presented here are not the end-point of an
analysis of cognitive synergy in PrimeAGI, but rather a milestone somewhere near the start of the path.
9 Next Directions
We have presented an abstract, relatively formal model of cognitive synergy, in terms of a series of increasingly
specific models of intelligent agency. This work can be extended in two, somewhat opposite directions:
• Explicating in more detail how cognitive synergy works in the context of specific combinations of PGMC-driven,
hypergraph-based cognitive processes – such as the ones occurring in PrimeAGI and implemented in OpenCog
• Generalizing and extending the model, e.g. to other sorts of Cognit Agents besides hypergraph-based agents.
There is a growing literature on categorial models of computation, and it seems clear that the core concepts
presented here could be elaborated into the context of these more abstract computation models, beyond hy-
pergraphs. The role of hypergraph homomorphisms in the above discussions could be replaced by more general
sorts of morphisms; and probability distributions over other Heyting algebras could be used in place of distri-
butions over hypergraphs; etc.
It might happen that these two research directions converge, in the sense that exploration of more abstract formula-
tions of cognitive synergy might actually end up simplifying the use of cognitive synergy to analyze the interaction
of specific cognitive processes, such as pattern mining and evolutionary learning, in specific AI architectures like
PrimeAGI. In any case, in this paper we have just dipped our toe into these rough but fascinating waters; and most
of the pure and applied theoretical work in these directions is yet to be done.
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